On April 20, 2026, General Évariste Ndayishimiye undertook an official “friendship and working” visit to Ouagadougou. At the time, the Burundian head of state held the rotating chairmanship of the African Union (AU).

This diplomatic initiative aimed to re-establish dialogue between the continental organization and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This alliance, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, is currently chaired by Captain Ibrahim Traoré.

The outreach occurred amidst the withdrawal of AES member states from AU bodies. During his visit to Burkina Faso, a nation led by a regime that emerged from a military coup, the Burundian president lauded efforts to restore security and stabilize the country, where its leader has publicly stated that democracy is no longer a relevant concern.

Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric of “dialogue” and “stability,” one might discern a pattern of solidarity among authoritarian regimes, united by their shared rejection of constitutional constraints.

My doctoral research explores international sanctions (from the European Union and regional organizations) and authoritarian resilience in fragile states, using Burundi as a comparative case study. A chapter of this work is dedicated to other sanctioned nations, notably Mali and Niger. Here, I analyze the political resources that Mali and Burundi leverage to withstand external pressures.

A convergence of trajectories

It is crucial to recall the institutional convergence linking Burundi with the AES states. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU) following coups d’état in Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023).

Burundi itself was sanctioned by the EU and the United States in 2016, in response to President Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to pursue a third term deemed unconstitutional. Certain political phenomena necessitate a trans-regional comparative approach. This method does not merely seek superficial resemblances; instead, it aims to uncover profound, convergent underlying logics.

The rapprochement between Burundi and Mali, for instance—two countries separated by thousands of kilometers and operating in distinct geopolitical environments—exemplifies such an approach.

Designating an enemy

In both instances, the identification of an enemy, whether internal or external, serves as a crucial mechanism for legitimacy and a powerful driver of internal cohesion. This strategy enables the constant reactivation of a perceived threat based on political circumstances, be it a colonial adversary, a regional rival, or a diffuse security menace.

In Mali, this mechanism intensified in early 2022. Propelled by a “rally around the flag” effect—a phenomenon where the populace unites behind leaders in the face of an external or perceived threat—the Malian authorities saw their power consolidate.

Now bolstered by a civilian component in the second iteration of the transition following the May 2021 putsch, the military leadership garnered massive popular support.

Tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on Boulevard de l’Indépendance on January 14, 2022, to denounce economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS. They chanted their hostility towards Paris and the regional organization, accusing them of interfering in the country’s affairs. They also asserted a demand for a Mali solely for its citizens, free from external influences.

In Burundi, it is Belgium that crystallizes the anger of supporters of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), the ruling party. Designated as historically responsible for ethnic divisions in the country, the former colonial power is also accused of complicity with Rwanda in attempts to destabilize the incumbent regime.

The Burundian government, led by the CNDD-FDD, portrays Brussels as the instigator of economic sanctions imposed by the EU—a rhetoric that allows both regimes to deflect international criticism towards a narrative of resistance against the former colonizer.

Choosing a regional adversary

At the regional level, each regime also selects an adversary. In Mali, Algeria is accused of harboring certain opposition figures, such as Imam Mahmoud Dicko, and of colluding with active terrorist groups within the country. The Malian junta announced the “immediate termination” of the Algiers peace agreement on January 25, 2024.

Mali also closed its airspace to Algeria, after the latter took a similar measure in April 2025. In Burundi, however, Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, a Tutsi-led regime, plays this adversarial role.

Labeled a “bad neighbor” by President Ndayishimiye, Kigali is accused of having sheltered the plotters involved in the 2015 coup attempt. Rwanda is also presented by Burundian authorities as supporting rebel movements such as RED-Tabara, sometimes linked to other armed groups in the region.

This defensive posture led to the closure of land borders with Rwanda in January 2024, as well as an active military intervention in eastern DRC between August 2022 and December 2025 to support the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), alongside the Wazalendo militias (patriots in Kiswahili) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), against the M23 movement, which is backed by Kigali.

These symbolic resources are mobilized to maintain a perpetual sense of siege—a necessary condition for the political survival of regimes that have made external threats their primary fuel.

The security contradiction

A security contradiction, however, emerges between the two countries. In Mali, the threat appears more immediate through the attacks perpetrated by the FLA and JNIM on April 25, 2026. These attacks bolster the credibility of the regime’s security discourse.

This divergence in the nature of the threat leads to distinct legitimization strategies.

The head of the junta in Mali, Assimi Goïta, has freed himself from electoral constraints. In July 2025, the National Transitional Council granted him a five-year renewable mandate without elections and without term limits, completing a drift that began with the initial postponements of the ballot promised for March 2024.

The junta no longer needs to legitimize a vote but has positioned itself as the sole bulwark capable of defeating JNIM and FLA—even as the Malian economy, while resilient, remains exposed to recurrent power outages and the gradual withdrawal of development and humanitarian aid.

In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD has nominated the incumbent president as its candidate for the 2027 presidential election, and the ballot, even if controlled, remains a mandatory step.

The security record highlighted by Gitega, therefore, does not replace an election; rather, it aims to prepare for it, in a context where the security narrative allows economic performance—marked by fuel and currency shortages affecting the country since 2015—to be relegated to the background.

Considered among the world’s poorest nations—with Burundi ranking last in 2023—does the recourse to externalizing responsibility through the constant construction of an enemy also mask, according to French political scientist Jean-François Bayart’s analytical framework, internal dynamics of predation that structure authoritarian regimes?

Ultimately, the Mali-Burundi comparison reveals less about the singularity of each trajectory and more about the robustness of a common logic among regimes that have transformed their enemies not into burdens, but into their very foundation.