The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a prominent separatist movement, has forged an alliance with the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda-linked group. This weekend, they are launching a second military offensive aimed at reclaiming control of northern and central Malian regions currently under government command.

This renewed push comes nearly two months after the FLA initially partnered with the Al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM to conduct synchronized attacks across Mali’s northern, central, and southern territories on April 25.

Those earlier assaults reached Kati, a critical stronghold for Mali’s military leadership, severely shaking the government led by Assimi Goïta. The Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, was tragically killed, and the head of intelligence services, Modibo Koné, sustained grave injuries.

The FLA had previously recaptured Kidal, a highly symbolic fortress for the Malian army and the Russian Africa Corps (AFRICC) troops, which they had seized in 2023. Its recapture by the FLA marked a significant blow to their military successes in the northern part of the country.

Following the April 25 attacks, the Malian army announced that it had regained control of Kidal after a counter-offensive.

Reports from various social media accounts and specialized Sahel security blogs indicate a fresh mobilization by the FLA, including the recruitment of northern Malian residents in preparation for this upcoming offensive.

On June 4, Malian authorities declared a total reward of $12.4 million for any information leading to the apprehension or elimination of JNIM and FLA leaders.

Both the Malian army and the Africa Corps have intensified their operations across northern Mali. Concurrently, substantial investments are being made in military equipment to bolster defenses against further attacks.

Who comprises the FLA?

The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) was established on November 30, 2024, in Tinzaouatene, a small northern Malian town bordering Algeria. It emerged from the merger of various Tuareg and Arab separatist armed groups, all unified by the goal of Azawad’s independence.

Azawad refers to a specific region encompassing the cities of Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Ménaka, which the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) – one of the FLA’s founding groups – unilaterally declared an independent state in 2012.

The FLA is the successor to the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PDA), which itself was a coalition formed from several separatist factions.

These predecessor organizations included the MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), rebel factions of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), and the pro-government Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (Gatia).

The roots of Tuareg unity, however, trace back to 1988 in Libya, where the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) was founded by Algerian and Libyan exiles under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghaly, who now commands the JNIM.

Bilal Ag Acherif, born in Kidal in 1977, serves as the president of the FLA, playing a pivotal role in the movement’s political direction and governance.

Acherif’s right-hand man, Alghabass Ag Intalla, acts as the FLA’s military chief, responsible for reconciliation efforts and relations with the JNIM. Intalla is the son of the late Ifoghas traditional leader, Intallah Ag Attaher, who passed away in 2014.

Mohamed Ramadane holds the position of the group’s spokesperson.

What are the FLA’s objectives?

Certains Arab and Tuareg communities have been in opposition to the Malian government since the nation gained independence in 1960. This long-standing tension has fueled armed rebellions in 1962, 1990-1996, and most recently in 2012.

The FLA’s ultimate goal is the establishment of an “Azawad Republic,” intended as a homeland for the estimated two million Tuaregs scattered across West and North Africa, a consequence of colonial fragmentation.

The FLA accuses the Malian government of systematic political, economic, and cultural marginalization of their communities.

While northern Mali boasts rich reserves of salt, uranium, gold, diamonds, and phosphates, government investment in basic infrastructure such as schools, health centers, water and electricity supply, and roads remains notably scarce.

Acherif recently championed the movement’s independence efforts, asserting that Azawad “was annexed to Mali without regard for its history as an independent civilization.”

The Malian government has leveled accusations against neighboring Algeria and Mauritania, alleging their support for the FLA. Algeria previously mediated the Algiers Accords, signed in 2015 between the Malian government and northern armed groups, an agreement Mali formally abandoned in January 2024.

Ukraine, Mauritania, and France have also faced accusations of backing the FLA’s cause.

The precise number of FLA fighters remains undisclosed. Ramadane stated that the group maintains a “strong military presence extending from the Mauritanian border to the Algerian frontier.” Their primary camps are situated near the Algerian border, particularly in Kidal and Tinzaouatine.

Between 2024 and 2025, the FLA predominantly utilized kamikaze drones in their attacks. However, the FLA frequently disseminates images depicting fighters armed with rifles, positioned in long convoys of pickup trucks traversing the desert, reflecting their on-the-ground Sahel presence.

How have FLA and JNIM relations evolved?

JNIM leader Ghaly himself was a prominent figure in the Tuareg rebellion before shifting towards radical Islamist groups in the late 1990s. The current relationship between JNIM and the FLA, however, began to take shape in mid-2024.

In May 2024, Ag Intalla reportedly announced that the CSP-DPA had initiated discussions aimed at rapprochement with the JNIM. Ramadane later clarified that the FLA and JNIM had agreed upon a “tacit non-aggression pact.”

Later, in July 2024, the CSP-DPA, with assistance from the JNIM, inflicted heavy casualties on dozens of Malian soldiers and Russian Wagner Group mercenaries during the Battle of Tinzaouatene.

The armed group criticized the FLA for not acknowledging the “sacrifices and generosity” demonstrated by the JNIM during the fighting.

In March 2025, Malian media outlets reported that, following talks held in late February 2025, the two groups had agreed to jointly combat the army and Russian troops. After the widespread attacks across Mali on April 25, both groups publicly acknowledged their partnership.

The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) framed this agreement as a “strategic convergence” aimed at overthrowing the Malian military government. Conversely, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) asserted that this partnership became viable after the Tuaregs expressed readiness for the “establishment of Sharia law.”

Acherif informed Al Arabiya Al Hadath that the FLA and JNIM operate within the same region and confront a shared adversary.

“Ideological differences exist, but we are discussing local solutions,” he affirmed.

The long-term viability of this partnership remains uncertain, primarily due to the inherent ideological disparities and divergent ultimate objectives of the two groups, a key point in Sahel current affairs.