Regional powers vie for influence in the Sahel
On the surface, the nations within the Sahel belt – a geographical expanse stretching from Mali to Chad – hardly present themselves as a burgeoning economic haven. To put it simply, this isn’t the Singapore of foreign direct investment. Key economic indicators for Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger reveal significant vulnerabilities. In Mali, a striking 47% of its 25.9 million inhabitants are under 15 years old, only 25% of its land is arable, and the country ranks 188th out of 193 in the UNDP’s Human Development Index. Nearly 45% of the population lives below the poverty line. Ouagadougou and Niamey exhibit comparable statistics, with 40% and 60.5% of their populations, respectively, living below the poverty threshold (World Bank data). These three landlocked countries are currently governed by military leaders who have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a bloc that has received tacit support from the Kremlin, eager to diminish remaining French influence. Their declared anti-French, anti-Western, and anti-democratic stance was intended to usher in prosperity for their citizens, a prosperity they claimed was withheld by Europeans; however, this has not materialized. Nevertheless, two neighboring countries are now extending their services: Algeria and Morocco.
Morocco: an Atlantic gateway for Sahel development
Through the ambitious Dakhla Atlantique port construction, the Kingdom of Morocco is establishing an infrastructure project in the Western Sahara that mirrors the strategic significance of Tanger Med, a major hub connecting with Europe. Expected to be completed by 2028 and operational the following year, this facility is envisioned as a crucial entry point for West African trade and a vital conduit to the Americas. Rabat has hosted the three leaders of the AES, presenting a sharp geopolitical proposition: a deep-water port, potentially complemented by a future railway line (though not yet confirmed), that would provide these three landlocked nations with direct access to the ocean, effectively overcoming their geographical isolation and fostering economic growth. For Morocco, which faces geographical constraints due to its ongoing dispute with Algeria, this initiative serves a dual purpose. It demonstrates that its development plan for the Western Sahara can benefit the entire sub-region, and it posits that economic advancement can indirectly combat the jihadist groups plaguing the Sahel by offering a lifeline to a desperate youth population, especially considering the region’s rapidly increasing birth rate, which is projected to double its population within a decade.
Algeria: a trans-Saharan gas pipeline to Europe
Algeria, which previously experienced strained relations with Niger, mended ties with Abderrahmane Tiani, the head of Niger’s military government, in mid-February. Algeria proposed to commence construction of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline segment, originating in Nigeria and now planned to pass through Niger before reaching Algerian territory, immediately after Ramadan. This extensive 4800-kilometer pipeline is designed to supply natural gas to Europe. Sonatrach, Algeria’s national hydrocarbon company, would oversee the construction within Nigerien borders and provide training to Nigerien personnel for its operation. This commitment to local capacity building stands as a distinct advantage compared to approaches by other foreign actors, such as China, which often do not offer similar training for the management of national resources.
Complementary yet clashing regional strategies
In late February, discussions began in both Madrid and Washington regarding Morocco’s autonomy plan for the Western Sahara. Should this conflict, now in its fiftieth year, finally resolve, Algeria and Morocco could potentially collaborate on the Sahel’s explosively complex security and demographic challenges. Such cooperation would prevent the AES states from leveraging existing rivalries between the two regional capitals.
Jihadism thrives on the combined scourges of profound poverty and authoritarian governance. Both Algeria and Rabat, each pursuing their own objectives, aim to disrupt this perilous cycle. Each country offers distinct strengths: Algeria emphasizes its hydrocarbon resources and Sonatrach’s specialized expertise, while Rabat highlights its grand infrastructure projects and its aspiration to serve as a pivotal hub connecting Africa, America, and Europe. These two strategies, though inherently complementary, are unfortunately pitted against each other due to the unresolved Sahrawi conflict. This divergence is a missed opportunity.
*On September 26, 2025, Mali’s Prime Minister, Abdoulaye Maïga, publicly demanded that Algeria “cease supporting international terrorism.” In response, Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Ahmed Attaf, denounced this as a “rant of a ruffian.”