Jihadist militant groups intensify economic warfare across West Africa

In 2025, militant groups operating in the Sahel and coastal West Africa escalated their strategies of economic warfare, targeting vital trade routes, infrastructure, and civilian livelihoods. The Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) expanded their influence beyond traditional strongholds, disrupting economies and challenging state authority across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and into neighboring Benin and Nigeria.

Key trends shaping the conflict landscape

From January to November 2025, violence in the region surged with devastating consequences:

• Over 10,000 fatalities were recorded in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger due to political violence.
• 30 foreign nationals were kidnapped in Mali (22) and Niger (8), while Benin saw a 70% increase in fatalities compared to the same period in 2024.

JNIM and ISSP have adopted economic sabotage as a core tactic to destabilize governments and undermine public trust. In Mali, JNIM imposed a fuel and transport embargo on cities like Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, crippling trade routes connecting Bamako to critical regions. The blockade triggered fuel shortages and sharp price increases, exacerbating economic hardship and eroding confidence in the military-led regime.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM’s offensives have grown increasingly bold, including the temporary seizure of provincial capitals such as Djibo and Diapaga in May. The group’s ambush on a military convoy near Koubel-Alpha in Soum province in September resulted in one of the deadliest attacks on national forces, underscoring its evolving military capabilities. These operations aim not only to weaken state control but also to demonstrate the junta’s inability to protect its citizens.

Militant expansion into coastal West Africa

The conflict has expanded southward into coastal West Africa, particularly along the Benin-Niger-Nigeria borderlands. This tri-border region has become a critical battleground, with both JNIM and ISSP establishing footholds and intensifying cross-border operations.

In Benin, JNIM’s incursions have led to record-high violence, including the killing of over 50 soldiers in Park W and advances into Borgou department along the Nigerian border. By late October, the group claimed its first attack in Nigeria, signaling a broader regional strategy. Meanwhile, ISSP has reinforced its presence in southwestern Niger, moving closer to Gaya on the border with Benin, and continued operations in Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states.

The merging of Sahelian and Nigerian militant theaters represents a significant shift. Groups such as Ansaru, Mahmuda, and factions of the Islamic State West Africa Province are increasingly overlapping in these border areas, creating a complex and interconnected conflict environment stretching from Mali to western Nigeria.

Eroding state authority and rising instability

The sustained pressure from militant groups has exposed deep vulnerabilities in the region’s military regimes. In Mali and Burkina Faso, prolonged blockades, sieges, and territorial losses have weakened state institutions, while internal fractures within the armed forces risk triggering unrest. The inability to secure provincial capitals and rural areas has emboldened militants to enforce their own social and economic order, taxing populations and restricting access to livelihoods.

Local self-defense groups, such as Dozo militias in Mali and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) in Burkina Faso, are under severe strain. Many Dozo militias have been disarmed or forced into agreements with JNIM, leaving communities dependent on militant-enforced security arrangements. The VDP, once central to the Burkina Faso junta’s counter-insurgency strategy, has suffered heavy losses and remains largely defensive, limiting the state’s ability to reclaim territory.

Niger remains vulnerable to militant expansion, with violence spreading into southern Dosso and northern Agadez. ISSP has targeted the Benin-Niger oil pipeline, while the kidnapping of a U.S. citizen in Niamey in October highlighted the growing reach of militants into urban centers previously considered secure.

Regional implications for 2026

The convergence of Sahelian and Nigerian militants in the tri-border region is likely to intensify in 2026, creating a new frontline that challenges regional cooperation. The Africa Corps, which replaced the Wagner Group in supporting Sahelian regimes, has provided limited logistical support, particularly in securing fuel convoys in southern Mali. However, the broader security challenge remains unaddressed, raising concerns about further territorial fragmentation and political destabilization.

If current trends continue, the central Sahel and its southern borders may face deeper instability, with potential spillover effects into neighboring countries. The combination of weakened militias, eroding state capacity, and sustained militant pressure heightens the risk of political unrest, coups, and the collapse of military regimes.