The Central African Republic (CAR) has grappled with profound instability since at least 2004, when a three-year civil war engulfed the nation, followed by persistent battles against insurgent groups. In an effort to restore order, the government extended an invitation to Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group in early 2018, initially for training purposes.

By 2019, the Wagner Group had deployed over 1,000 mercenaries across the Central African Republic. These operatives seamlessly integrated into the country’s political, economic, and social frameworks, with a strategic focus on exploiting gold extraction, diamond resources, and timber harvesting. This deep involvement catalyzed the emergence of a pervasive conflict economy, where mercenaries and other factions capitalize on the nation’s enduring turmoil.

“Wagner not only forcefully and intimidatingly infiltrated local markets but also secured a stronghold within President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s administration, installing a Russian national as a senior security advisor,” I observed, reflecting insights from experts Christopher Faulkner and Raphael Parens.

In 2021, a joint military offensive was launched nationwide by Wagner and government forces. While ostensibly a stabilization campaign, it rapidly “transitioned from counter-insurgency to a more extensive process of territorial, political, and economic consolidation,” according to a comprehensive report I reviewed.

Today, the combined might of government and Wagner forces has fundamentally reshaped the economy. What once sustained rebel groups has been reconfigured into networks designed to bolster the Touadéra government and enrich Russia.

“Local elites, alongside their foreign security partners, assimilated armed groups, and economic actors, have wielded coercion and organized crime to solidify their power, control vital resources, and advance their financial agendas, effectively transforming the CAR into a hub for powerful transnational criminal networks,” stated the report, co-authored by Nathalia Dukhan and Ruben de Koning. Beyond Russian influence, countries like the United Arab Emirates, Rwanda, and Turkey also exert considerable sway in the Central African Republic.

The involvement of Russian mercenaries in the CAR is undeniably transactional. Their expanding presence aims to merge security, economic, and political control over natural resources, all to “perpetuate Russia’s long-term influence,” as detailed in the extensive 72-page analysis.

As the report’s authors underscored, “With Russian backing, Touadéra has cemented his political authority, and Wagner-linked actors and allies have become embedded in crucial ministries, security agencies, customs administration, and the strategic resources sector. Rather than fostering stability, Bangui and Moscow have deepened and systematized patterns of coercion, extraction, and predation.”

Governmental successes against armed groups have not eradicated “conflict rapacity” in the mining, trade routes, and taxation sectors. Instead, this predatory exploitation has been redirected to “government-linked actors and networks and individuals within the government, who now profit from these various sectors,” Ruben de Koning explained in an interview.

Russia, in particular, has reaped substantial benefits from the gold and fuel trade in the Central African Republic. Wagner has established an “illicit fuel supply chain” to underwrite its joint military operations with the government and its extensive mining activities.

Ruben de Koning expressed his astonishment at the sheer scale of Wagner’s involvement in the CAR’s gold trade, noting, “What truly shocked me was specifically the sheer mass and blatant volume of gold being mined in the country.” He further revealed that Wagner-controlled interests are producing approximately 5 tons of gold annually.

“This gold holds an export value of around $250 million, but on the international market, its worth can easily climb to $500 million.”

From 2021 onwards, Russian and Rwandan forces successfully reclaimed pivotal mining regions across the country, effectively preventing armed groups from controlling these territories. Consequently, a greater volume of artisanally sourced gold began to be exported through official channels. By 2023, gold exports reached 1.7 tons. While initial projections anticipated total exports of approximately 2.5 tons in 2025, the actual figure surged to 7 tons by year-end.

This figure “far exceeds artisanal production capacity, suggesting it must include industrially sourced gold, most likely from Wagner’s concessions,” Ruben de Koning observed.

While the security agreement between Russia and the Central African Republic stands out on the continent, Russia’s ambition to seize resources from African nations, particularly gold, is not unique. Russian forces have reportedly acquired over $2.5 billion worth of African gold between February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, and the close of 2023, according to reports.

Russia’s voracious appetite for gold is predominantly focused on the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. Wagner has secured exclusive rights to the Ndassima mine, the largest in the CAR, and Russia controls a major refinery while serving as the “primary buyer of unprocessed Sudanese gold” in Sudan. In Mali, Russian mercenaries reportedly receive millions of dollars in cash each month from the ruling junta, which heavily relies on gold extraction companies for the bulk of its tax revenues. This intricate arrangement circumvents international sanctions through “complex smuggling routes and commercial concealment tactics” employed in the Central African Republic and Sudan, as I discovered through my reporting on the ground Sahel current affairs.