After three years of relentless fighting, the Sudanese war has now spilled across borders, engulfing Chad in its wake. Border strikes, heightened military posturing, and simmering communal tensions: the crisis in Sudan has caught N’Djamena off guard.

Since April 2023, Sudan has been torn apart by a brutal conflict between the army of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti. Though Chad has publicly maintained a stance of neutrality, its actions have told a different story. N’Djamena has, in fact, quietly backed the RSF, a decision that has sparked fierce controversy. This alignment places the Chadian government in a precarious position: supporting a faction that has been accused of targeting Zaghawa communities in Darfur, a group deeply embedded in Chad’s state apparatus. Weapons, reportedly funded by the United Arab Emirates, have been transported through towns like Amdjarass and Adré, a gamble with consequences that were always foreseeable—and now, they are materializing.

Two towns share the name Tiné—one in Sudan, the other in Chad. These twin settlements are home to the same Zaghawa populations and serve as a critical crossing point for civilians fleeing the horrors of Darfur’s northern war zones to seek refuge in Chad.

On February 21, 2026, the RSF seized control of the Sudanese side of Tiné, only to be met with fierce resistance from the Toroboros—Chadian and Sudanese fighters allied with General al-Burhan—and Chadian troops operating without official authorization. These clashes led to a swift recapture of the town. In response, Chad announced the closure of its border, yet fighting persisted, underscoring the conflict’s deep roots in this transborder region.

The situation took a deadly turn on March 21, when a drone strike rocked Tiné in Chad, leaving nearly two dozen civilians dead. While Chadian authorities deny involvement, suspicions run high. Opposition figure Ousmane Dillo, currently exiled in Sudan, released an audio recording widely circulated on private messaging platforms, directly accusing Mahamat Déby and calling for his removal. He also warned that the leader’s policies endanger the Zaghawa community. On the Sudanese side, Minni Arkou Minawi, Darfur’s governor, went even further, declaring that “the war with Chad has already begun,” signaling a dangerous regional escalation.

Chadian officials have stood their ground, projecting an image of unwavering resolve. Government spokesperson Gassim Chérif Mahamat reiterated Chad’s neutrality while vowing a “proportionate” response to any attacks. Meanwhile, President Mahamat Déby ordered the military into full alert. On March 22, a high-level security summit convened in Tiné, bringing together top military brass to bolster border defenses and prevent further destabilization. “This is Tiné, Chad—not Tiné, Sudan. The Sudanese army, the Toroboros, the RSF—let them fight it out in their own country. Let them slaughter each other there. They must not bring their war here to kill our people,” declared General Ali Ahmat Akhabach, Minister of Security.

The government followed up by banning civilians from crossing the border, a move ostensibly aimed at preventing a Zaghawa rebellion. Yet the decision also traps women and children fleeing Sudan’s war zones, blocking their access to safety in Chadian refugee camps. While framed as a security measure, critics argue it does little to address the root of the problem. According to Cameron Hudson, an expert on the Sudanese conflict: “Chad’s military is doubling down on its border deployment amid rising tensions. This risks dragging Chad directly into the Sudanese war rather than keeping it at bay. Déby’s show of force may be a miscalculation that could backfire.”

The spillover from Sudan’s conflict is not limited to the Zaghawa. Security sources in Chad report that the RSF has been recruiting young men from the Tama community in recent weeks. This mobilization, which resembles mercenary activity, relies on local networks involving traditional leaders, administrative authorities, and figures close to the regime.

Like the Zaghawa, the Tama are a transborder community, present on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border, particularly in the regions of Wadi Fira and Ouaddaï in Chad and western Sudan. Though not Arab, during the first Darfur war that began in 2003, they were integrated into the Janjaweed militias—the precursors to Hemedti’s forces—and deployed against ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa. This development is deeply troubling, as it revives old fractures within Chadian society and fuels fears of communal violence.

What was once a murky strategic calculation has now spiraled into a full-blown crisis. Chad’s government finds itself trapped in a cycle of escalation it may no longer control. The genie is out of the bottle—and it shows no signs of going back in.