The definition of a coup d’état often shifts, influenced by the perceived interests and goodwill of the international community and its neighboring states. In Burkina Faso, the “designation” of Transitional President Michel Kafando was deemed unconstitutional. Consequently, the nation was set to operate for at least twelve months with newly established, provisional institutions.

Much like assembling a Lego set, the transitional institutions in Burkina Faso gradually took shape. Following the sudden appearance of military uniforms on the public scene, in the wake of former President Blaise Compaoré’s hasty departure from Kosyam, Ouagadougou seemed to regain a sense of calm.

Emerging seemingly from nowhere, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida quickly dominated the political landscape, assuming all the prerogatives of a Head of State. His true intentions remained a subject of speculation. How did he manage to integrate among the protesters and political party leaders? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, perhaps, a concerted effort between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré to maintain control over power? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) openly siding with the populace sparked considerable distrust and suspicion. The military’s early actions, including the suspension of the Constitution and dissolution of the National Assembly, raised fears of a junta taking hold, threatening to strip the people of their hard-won victory achieved through sacrifice and bloodshed.

True to form, the African Union promptly threatened to isolate Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, a delegation of ECOWAS heads of state – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – arrived in force to engage with the military leadership, urging them to soften their stance. The precedent set by other military leaders, such as Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali, undoubtedly prompted Burkinabé officers to reconsider. They understood that seizing power by force would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted crisis resolution process risked isolating the country and leading to growing unpopularity.

Ultimately, the military negotiated a compromise solution, formalized in the Transition Charter. The agreement stipulated that the Executive branch’s transitional presidency would be led by a civilian, while the military would retain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body, the National Transition Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who spearheaded the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising about twenty members, was tasked with the crucial responsibility of naming a Transitional President. This temporary arrangement, a fixed-term contract, was set to conclude in November 2015, marking the end of President Blaise Compaoré’s original mandate.

For the selection of the Head of State, each vital component of the nation – the army, civil society, opposition parties, religious, and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five personalities were retained:

The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, who edits the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ critical stance against the former regime. The army, however, opted for a broader range of candidates: Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso, a diplomat Michel Kafando, and Joséphine Ouédraogo, a woman who also served as a former minister. Early on, the Archbishop of Bobo Dioulasso, initially considered a strong contender, declared his disinterest in the position, preferring to focus on his current ecclesiastical duties.

The two remaining candidates, Joséphine Ouédraogo and Michel Kafando, held a distinct advantage over the others due to their extensive experience within major international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando represented his country twice at the UN headquarters in New York, first between 1981 and 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the Land of the Upright Man, an invisible divide often separated the populace into those for or against Thomas Sankara. This implicit ideological cleavage influenced every political figure throughout their careers. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, on the other hand, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Prime Minister Thomas Sankara’s government under President Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and were diametrically opposed ideologically.

A career within an international institution offered a dual benefit: a significant boost to one’s curriculum vitae and an invaluable network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.

For a few months, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, was compelled to set aside his cattle and chicken farming in Saponé for a noble cause: to rescue a nation in peril. He assumed both the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic channels, providing a single interlocutor and effectively bypassing the head of government, Isaac Zida.

The evolving situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored by several capitals: Accra, which chaired ECOWAS at the time; Addis Ababa for the African Union; and Paris and Washington for geopolitical reasons. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (representing the AU), Ghana (representing ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a form of rehabilitation for Burkina Faso. The massive representation raised questions: did it implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks earlier? The United States typically adheres to the principle of not cooperating with heads of state who have not received a popular mandate, which was the case for Burkina Faso. The international community, therefore, found a way to legitimize the coup and establish a semblance of constitutional order. This ensured that American reconnaissance aircraft could remain in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relied on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as strategic footholds for monitoring the Sahel region.

Out of 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four key portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, former Minister of Security in 2011, took charge of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, was appointed to Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed duties at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was given the position of Keeper of the Seals – perhaps as a consolation prize – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned a few days after his appointment due to pressure from civil society, which criticized the former prosecutor for having “closed” the Norbert Zongo case.

The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 votes out of 90. The next steps involved completing the institutions and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), the electoral code, and organic laws.

What missions for this short transitional period?

Since early December, Michel Kafando signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate were crucial. More than 27 years after the assassination of Thomas Sankara, the Land of the Upright Man finally aimed to begin a process of catharsis. Immediately after his designation, one of President Michel Kafando’s first decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a role, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would request Morocco to “extradite” former President Blaise Compaoré.

Through a series of public announcements, the current leaders effectively opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases typically require a considerable amount of time, likely extending beyond the transitional period. Were these declarations made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s priority. In this context, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct superior – was dismissed from his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.

The question of loyalty arose: would Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma remain loyal to General Gilbert Diendéré? Burkina Faso managed to defuse the political crisis of October 30, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, without significant complications. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial skirmishes could have triggered a civil war. Perhaps it would be more prudent to focus on holding elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by exhuming the Sankara file?

How could a “witch hunt” be avoided? Two general managers of major national enterprises, considered close to the family of the ousted president, were already dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from the National Burkinabé Hydrocarbons Company (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from the National Burkinabé Electricity Company (SONABEL). An act of contrition, while not fully absolving past transgressions, contributes to appeasement. This was exemplified by the recent approach of Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid tribute to the seven individuals who fell victim to gunfire during the events of October 30 and 31; they now rest in the Gounghin cemetery.

Would the CRNR endure beyond the end of the transitional period? With all institutions now in place, political figures and parties were preparing to take center stage. No prominent political heavyweight chose to occupy a seat within either the Executive or the CNT, effectively signaling their intention to run in the upcoming universal suffrage elections. Presidential candidates were already in the starting blocks. The creation of the CNT also prompted the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to self-dissolve. The electoral battle was certainly poised to commence at the very beginning of 2015.