How jihadist groups are reshaping state power in Mali
On June 24, 2026, traffic resumed on the vital Bamako-Mourdiah-Nara corridor in central-western Mali, after weeks of blockade imposed by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Yet the reopening was not the result of a military operation by state forces. Instead, it followed negotiations led by local notables and community leaders, highlighting a shift in how power is contested in the Sahel.
The episode underscores a broader transformation in the region’s conflict dynamics. No longer just about seizing territory, the struggle increasingly revolves around controlling the functions that make a society function—ensuring safe travel, regulating commerce, arbitrating disputes, and maintaining predictable daily life. The JNIM, in particular, has moved beyond direct territorial control to capture the operational functions traditionally associated with the state.
From land seizures to functional dominance
The JNIM’s strategy has evolved significantly since 2024. While armed attacks on state forces continue, the group has expanded its tactics to include road blockades, supply restrictions, and control over commercial corridors linking key cities like Bamako, Kayes, Nioro-du-Sahel, Ségou, Mourdiah, and Nara. These measures don’t just disrupt movement—they disrupt the very fabric of economic and social life.
The implications are profound. An armed group no longer needs to govern an entire region to shape its daily reality. By regulating trade routes, levying informal taxes, or controlling access to markets, the JNIM demonstrates a form of performative legitimacy—a claim to authority rooted not in formal institutions, but in the tangible ability to provide order and security where state presence is weak or intermittent.
This shift challenges traditional readings of the conflict, which often focus on territorial control. Yet in the Sahel today, roads are no longer just infrastructure—they are political institutions. Controlling a highway means controlling the flows of goods, people, and information that define a community’s survival. The group’s actions reveal a deliberate strategy: to displace the state’s functional monopoly in peripheral areas, not by replacing it outright, but by making itself the more reliable provider of essential services.
When communities negotiate survival
The reopening of the Mourdiah-Nara axis was not a surrender of the JNIM’s demands. Rather, it reflected the complex negotiations that communities must undertake to survive. Traders, transporters, local chiefs, religious leaders, herders, and rural youth all have divergent interests—and all are forced to engage with armed actors to secure access to markets, safety, and resources.
These interactions are not ideological endorsements of the JNIM. They are pragmatic responses to immediate needs. Yet the group leverages these engagements to build credibility. By arbitrating disputes, securing routes, or resolving conflicts outside formal channels, it constructs an alternative source of authority—one that competes with the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of local populations.
This phenomenon challenges Max Weber’s classical definition of the state as the sole holder of legitimate violence and rational-legal authority. In the Sahel’s fragmented spaces, authority is plural and contested. The state retains its legal sovereignty, traditional authorities rely on social capital, and armed groups like the JNIM seek to translate coercive power into governance capability. The result is a fragmented sovereignty, where multiple actors claim to fulfill the state’s core functions—often more effectively than the state itself.
Redefining the battle for authority
The true stakes of the Sahel conflict may not be territorial conquest at all. They lie in the ability to produce and sustain order in the eyes of local populations. The JNIM’s strategy suggests a long-term project: not to build a parallel state, but to erode the state’s functional centrality in the regions where it is weakest.
For Mali and other Sahelian states, the challenge is clear. Reclaiming legitimacy will require more than military victories. It will demand restoring credibility as the most reliable provider of security, justice, and mobility. Every mediation, every reopened road, every dispute resolved outside formal institutions shifts the balance of perceived authority. The conflict is no longer just about who controls the land—it’s about who controls the daily life of the people who live on it.