Mali’s challenging path: five years post-coup d’état

This Sunday marks five years since General Assimi Goïta seized control of Mali through a coup d’état. The period since has seen a notable decline in the overall situation for the Malian populace, characterized by diminishing security, restricted freedom of expression, and a curtailed press. My colleague Dirke Köpp recently discussed these developments with Ulf Laessing, who serves as the Sahel Program Director for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali.

An interview with Ulf Laessing on the ground in Mali

Ulf Laessing observes that repression has intensified, making free expression a challenge. While candid discussions are still possible among trusted individuals in Mali, a palpable sense of caution now pervades. This represents a clear critique of the current administration. Furthermore, critical voices have faced imprisonment, and others have been compelled to seek exile.

What improvements, if any, have the Malian people experienced since the military assumed power?

Ulf Laessing notes that initially, some regions witnessed a slight improvement in security. For instance, the road to Ségou remained open for an extended period, allowing some farmers to return to their fields. However, this progress proved temporary. The crisis has persisted and deepened, exacerbated by rapid population growth, climate change impacts, and pervasive insecurity. He expresses deep pessimism regarding any government’s ability to significantly alter this trajectory.

In 2020, the military took power with the stated goal of eradicating jihadist groups. This objective appears to be largely unfulfilled.

Ulf Laessing confirms that both the JNIM and the Islamic State effectively control significant portions of the country. He believes that no government, whether through another coup or a future elected administration, will succeed in reclaiming these territories. He remains pessimistic about the prospects for pacifying Mali.

In late April, jihadists and Tuareg rebels launched several coordinated attacks.

Ulf Laessing describes these attacks as a profound shock, representing the most significant offensive since 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadists briefly seized control of the north before French intervention a year later. This was a direct assault on the state. While the government has maintained its position, losing control over certain northern areas, the rebels do not appear to be advancing further at present. Nevertheless, it constitutes a considerable blow to the government’s prestige. The dramatic nature of these attacks caught everyone by surprise, especially considering the presence of Russian forces, ostensibly there to enhance security.

These Russian mercenaries, in essence, withdrew without engaging in significant combat. Mali’s allies, Niger and Burkina Faso, members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), issued statements but provided no military assistance. Mali found itself relatively isolated. How do you explain this?

Ulf Laessing points out that the Russian presence has consistently been more about perception than actual effectiveness. With approximately 1,500 to 2,000 mercenaries, their numbers are a mere third of the French forces, who themselves struggled to pacify the entire nation. The Russians’ brutal tactics have, in fact, exacerbated the conflict. Ultimately, their withdrawal from Kidal and two other northern locations without a fight was a humiliation. Similarly, little support materialized from Niger and Burkina Faso. While they claimed to offer air support, Mali was largely left to fend for itself that day. This comes as no surprise, as both Niger and Burkina Faso are grappling with their own jihadist insurgencies. He doubts they possess the capacity to assist Mali, even if they had the desire.

Is the solidarity frequently touted by the three AES states weaker than believed?

Ulf Laessing explains that while politically, these nations are closely aligned and share many aspirations, they lack the political will and, crucially, the capabilities to realize these ambitions. The three military leaders are united by ideology, but they also preside over three of the world’s poorest countries. Therefore, one must be realistic about the potential of this cooperation. This is not a European Union building infrastructure together or a NATO alliance providing mutual defense; these are three extremely impoverished nations fighting for their very survival.

What potential solutions exist for Mali?

Ulf Laessing highlights a positive aspect: the Malian people generally reject Sharia law and Islamists. This sentiment could have fueled protests, despite the inherent dangers and repression, but it hasn’t, indicating a clear popular stance. He hopes this foundation can eventually lead to genuine negotiations with the more moderate elements among the jihadist groups, fostering a path toward dialogue.

But what could be the basis for such negotiations? Jihadists seek to control the country and impose Sharia. How can one negotiate with such entities?

Ulf Laessing believes the JNIM is not capable of controlling a major city like Bamako or the entire country. Their aim, he suggests, is to be left undisturbed, to control specific regions, and to reach an accommodation with other factions. In Bamako, they might seek a government willing to implement a degree of Sharia and engage in negotiations. Unlike the Middle East, these jihadists are not foreign combatants; they are local. Their motivations often stem from issues like access to water and land, which the jihadists exploit. He concludes that at some point, discussions will become inevitable. A military approach is necessary, but dialogue with moderate individuals is equally crucial. There are already nascent pressures for such dialogue emerging within Mali.

Mauritania faced a similar challenge, responding with both military force and strategic compromises. For instance, alcohol is prohibited, and the country is officially an Islamic Republic. It’s not about adopting a full Taliban-style program, but finding common ground to satisfy the country’s needs. Once instability is mitigated, the state will naturally have greater capacity to act.

And what do the people of Mali truly desire?

Ulf Laessing emphasizes that the people of Bamako do not want to live under Sharia law. The lack of widespread protests following the late April attacks, despite the regime’s vulnerability, underscores this. People understand that if the current government falls, the next one is likely to be more Islamist, which is not what they want. Despite the criticisms leveled against the military government, many still support it. They reject the alternatives: neither jihadist rule nor a return to the old, corrupt elites perceived as aligned with France and Europe. Therefore, barring further major attacks, the current government is likely to remain in power, bolstered by this public backing.

So, the impression conveyed by social media, suggesting widespread youth support for Assimi Goïta’s government, isn’t necessarily misleading?

Ulf Laessing notes that Mali’s average age is 15, with many young people lacking access to education and having no ties to Europe or France. They primarily consume information via social media, which is often saturated with propaganda, including Russian disinformation designed to bolster the government. He believes genuine support for the government persists. The late April attacks, for example, presented an opportune moment for protests, as the regime was weakened. Similar conditions existed in the autumn when fuel deliveries were disrupted. Yet, no significant demonstrations occurred, clearly indicating that the populace does not wish to be governed by the JNIM.

Perhaps they are simply too preoccupied with their daily survival, a situation now exacerbated by the blockade on Bamako?

Ulf Laessing confirms that life has become considerably more challenging, even before the recent attacks. People have grown resigned, losing faith in politicians. He also points out that traditional parties and veteran politicians have largely lost credibility, having been in power previously without bringing about significant improvement. Consequently, many Malians are willing to give the current administration a chance.