Following recent coordinated assaults across Mali, including Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously sensitive topic is gaining traction within Malian security discussions: should negotiations with jihadist factions be pursued? The scale of the joint offensive, spearheaded by the Al-Qaïda-linked Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) and the Tuareg rebel Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), has led many analysts and observers to suggest that a purely military approach is no longer sufficient.

The recent offensive has spread with unprecedented speed across Mali, from its northern reaches to its southern territories. Armed groups launched multiple synchronized assaults targeting state forces and governmental symbols in at least six urban centers, extending even to the vicinity of Bamako. This marks the first time the Jnim and the FLA have visibly collaborated on such a scale. The FLA, established in November 2024 following the disbandment of the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP), advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast region in northern Mali.

These recent attacks have starkly revealed the Malian regime’s fragility. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian partners from Africa Corps appear capable of halting the advance of these armed factions. Consequently, in regional media and diplomatic spheres, the prospect of engaging in negotiations with the Jnim is being discussed with increasing openness, against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual strangulation and a broader regional quagmire. Despite this, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue, asserting its refusal to engage with « armed terrorist groups » and adhering to a rigid military strategy, even as the security situation rapidly worsens.

Since late April, the pressure on the Malian government has intensified significantly. Violence is escalating across the country’s central areas. Just last Friday, several villages in the Bankass region, including Kouroude and Dougara, came under attack. Local and security sources indicate that the combined fatalities from assaults on Wednesday and Friday range between 70 and 80 individuals.

An unprecedented alliance, a stark warning

The Jnim remains the primary catalyst for jihadist activity across the Sahel, impacting not only Mali but also Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas comprising the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the situation is becoming increasingly dire. These governments, which seized power on pledges to restore security, are struggling to contain a threat that continues to expand. In Mali, attacks have been drawing relentlessly closer to the capital for nearly a year.

« À partir de juillet 2025, les djihadistes ont mené des attaques à l’ouest du Mali, sur des sites d’orpaillage et des sites industriels. Ils ont ensuite ciblé le corridor Bamako-Dakar, asphyxiant la capitale », souligne Alain Antil, directeur du Centre Afrique subsaharienne de l’Ifri. « This time, what is striking is not merely the scale of the operation, but also the deliberate selection of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the very core of the regime », observes Héni Nsaibia of the Acled.

The demise of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati sent profound shockwaves through the government. Concurrently, the recapture of Kidal in late 2023 had been hailed as a significant triumph, making its subsequent loss a major strategic setback for the authorities.

The strategy of suffocation

Even prior to this latest offensive, several specialists had noted a shift in the Jnim’s operational strategy. « There is an evident desire to establish a stronger power dynamic, not just through security pressure, but also to compel Malian authorities into negotiations », Alain Antil previously explained.

The jihadist organization is now attempting to scale up its localized tactics to a national level, employing economic blockades, the progressive encirclement of urban centers, and pressure on crucial logistical routes. « The Jnim is actively working to sustain an economic blockade around Bamako », emphasizes the researcher.

According to Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this strategy is conceived for the long haul: « They have opted to undermine the government from within, favoring a strategy of protracted conflict and leveraging weaknesses within the military apparatus ». He further notes: « The Jnim no longer insists on the implementation of Sharia law as a precondition for peace and has now expressed an openness to negotiation. »

Within this complex environment, the ongoing rivalry with the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara (EIGS) introduces an additional layer of instability, as each group strives to expand its territorial control and influence.

A once-taboo option gains traction

Officially, the governments of the Sahel categorically reject any notion of dialogue. « For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is simply not on the table. Their rhetoric remains confrontational, with military action presented as the sole viable solution », Alain Antil observes.

However, the reality on the ground presents a far more intricate picture. Atrocities committed by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public confidence. Between January 2024 and March 2025, approximately 1,500 civilians were killed by government troops and their Russian partners in Mali, a figure nearly five times higher than those attributed to the Jnim, according to GI-TOC data. This cycle of violence exacerbates local grievances and inadvertently aids jihadist recruitment efforts.

States must commit to a brave compromise.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, Sahel researcher

Faced with this deadlock, an increasing number of specialists are advocating for a fundamental shift in approach. « A purely military option is a dead end when confronting the jihadist challenge in the Sahel. It necessitates integration with political negotiations », contends Alain Antil of the Ifri. Certain grievances articulated by jihadist groups – such as corruption, issues of justice, and access to resources – could potentially serve as a foundation for discussions, without overlooking the violence they perpetuate.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa takes this perspective further, stating, « Governments must embrace a courageous compromise. The aim would be to incorporate jihadists into the political arena to expose their inherent limitations. » However, he clearly defines non-negotiable red lines: « The fundamental principle of gender equality and the secular character of the state cannot be compromised. »

As jihadist offensives continue their advance, the concept of negotiation is transforming from a heresy into a plausible political consideration. For numerous experts in Mali, the core question is no longer whether dialogue should occur, but rather how much longer Bamako can realistically avoid it.