Morocco’s dged covert operations: infiltrating the polisario from latin america
A remarkable glimpse into the clandestine world of Moroccan diplomacy and intelligence has emerged through a series of confidential dispatches. Dated October 2008 and originating from the Moroccan embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, these documents unveil Rabat’s intricate strategy to infiltrate the Polisario Front and undermine Algerian influence in Central America. This sophisticated plan leveraged crucial intelligence provided by Sahrawi diplomat Salama Ould Hennane.
The communications, addressed directly to Yassine El Mansouri, the esteemed head of the DGED (Direction Générale des Études et de la Documentation — Morocco’s foreign intelligence service), were penned by Ambassador Dr Brahim Housseine Moussa. They shed light on deep-seated tribal divisions within the separatist movement and significant geopolitical shifts, particularly in Panama.
exploiting tribal rifts: rguibate versus other factions within polisario
At the core of these revelations lies a golden opportunity for Rabat: the potential defection of senior Polisario officials. The Moroccan ambassador detailed multiple approaches by an individual identified as M. Sliman, the alias for Salama Ould Hennane, a native of Dakhla (from the Oulad Dlim tribe) and a former “ambassador” for the SADR in Panama and Central America.
Sliman’s assessment was stark: the separatist movement was gripped by “mécontentement très fort” (very strong discontent). This unrest stemmed from blatant favoritism shown by the Polisario leadership towards the Rguibatte tribe, at the expense of other tribal components, including the Oulad Dlim, Oulad Tidrarine, Ait Lahcen, Ait Baamran, and the Takna confederation.
According to the former separatist diplomat, the timing was perfect to deliver a decisive blow to the movement:
« C’est le moment idéal pour mener une action au sein du polisario, afin de l’affaiblir davantage et d’unifier les opposants de ce mouvement autour du projet de l’autonomie. »
Sliman claimed to have secured the agreement of several prominent SADR figures to form an internal opposition. These individuals reportedly included:
- Ahmed ould Souilem (Minister Delegate for Arab Countries).
- Mahfoud Ould Ahmed Zine (former minister and military region chief).
- Mansour (former Foreign Minister and representative in Paris).
The ambitious plan presented to the DGED involved encouraging these personalities to establish an official opposition group, publicly announce their dissent at an international press conference (likely in Madrid), and openly declare their support for Morocco’s proposed Autonomy Project. Ambassador Moussa further suggested to his superiors that Sliman be utilized as an “agent infiltré” (infiltrated agent) to execute this destabilization effort.
the battle for central america: Algeria’s “blank cheque” diplomacy
Beyond internal power struggles, the correspondence revealed an intense war of influence between Rabat and Algiers across Latin America. In October 2008, Moroccan diplomatic channels learned of an impending tour of Central America by a significant Algerian delegation, led by Algeria’s ambassador to Washington, M. Baali.
Algeria’s objective was clear: to counteract the momentum of Morocco’s autonomy plan, which had been presented to the UN. To win over Latin American capitals, Algeria deployed a lavish strategy, offering a “paquet de projets de coopération” (package of cooperation projects), implying substantial financial and economic aid, in exchange for alignment with separatist positions. Concurrently, the Polisario dispatched its emissary, Mohamed Yaslem Beissat, to Panama in an attempt to mend any emerging rifts.
panama’s strategic pivot in the western Sahara conflict
Panama emerged as a crucial focal point in this diplomatic tug-of-war. The documents confirmed a significant cooling of relations between Panama City and the separatists. Panamanian authorities, at that time, refused to accredit a new SADR ambassador, effectively downgrading Sahrawi representation to the lower status of a mere “chargé d’affaires.”
In response to this development, the Moroccan ambassador urgently alerted Rabat: Panama expected a reciprocal gesture. The diplomat strongly advocated for Morocco to send an official emissary to solidify this bilateral rapprochement and decisively block Algerian maneuvers.
In a final lobbying effort, the Moroccan diplomat disclosed that he had activated his trusted networks within the Panamanian government to obstruct Polisario’s requests, issuing a thinly veiled warning: any reversal by Panama “pourrait porter préjudice aux relations bilatérales avec le Royaume du Maroc” (could prejudice bilateral relations with the Kingdom of Morocco).
mohamed abdelaziz’s confidential itinerary revealed
Further demonstrating the precision of intelligence gathered by the embassy, a document from October 27, 2008, meticulously detailed the upcoming agenda of the then-Polisario chief, Mohamed Abdelaziz. This included a visit to New York on November 4 to meet with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, followed by a trip on November 9 to Valencia, Spain, for the closing of the European Conference of Support for the Sahrawi People (EUCOCO).
These diplomatic archives vividly illustrate the harsh realities of the Sahara conflict: a shadow war where North Africa and Latin America converge, and where the strength of alliances is determined as much by secret embassy dealings as by underlying tribal rivalries.