JnIM blockade threatens west African trade flows

The recent coordinated terrorist attacks in Mali have severely obstructed the main commercial corridors linking coastal and Sahelian states.

On 25 April, Mali faced a series of coordinated attacks launched by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA). These operations targeted the cities of Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao and the capital Bamako, causing many casualties and resulting in the assassination of Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

Malian authorities responded with a counter-offensive aimed at positions held by these groups. The military prosecutor in Bamako announced the arrest of several suspects, including civilians, active-duty soldiers, and dismissed army personnel.

Five days after the attacks began, JNIM imposed a blockade on the capital, specifically targeting routes in the country’s west. The complete closure of the road linking Kita to Bamako trapped hundreds of people and complicated food and water supplies.

This siege is also disrupting commercial flows, halting all traffic on the Kayes-Bamako axis. Moreover, the blockade has expanded to include attacks on transport convoys on the Conakry-Bamako route, which had previously been relatively safe.

Since September 2025, JNIM has adopted a strategy targeting fuel convoys on key supply routes in western and southern Mali. These attacks destabilise trade and, if they continue to expand, are likely to affect West African economies.

West African countries are closely linked through trade. The ports of coastal states currently serve as the main entry and exit points for the central Sahel countries. The road corridors connecting these ports to Sahelian capitals and beyond act as lifelines, many of which pass through JNIM operational zones.

The Dakar-Bamako corridor represents a strategic axis for both countries and appears to be the most affected by insecurity in western Mali.

The strategic Dakar-Bamako axis seems hardest hit by insecurity in western Mali

In 2024, Mali was Senegal’s top customer, absorbing 26.5% of Senegalese exports, worth about 802.8 billion FCFA (1.42 billion dollars). During the first nine months of 2025, cumulative Senegalese exports to Mali were estimated at 662 billion FCFA (1.17 billion dollars).

According to data from Senegal’s Directorate of Forecasting and Economic Studies (2025), JNIM attacks in western Mali have had a considerable impact on trade between the two countries compared to 2024 levels. Between September and November 2025, the port of Dakar recorded a daily blockage of about 120 containers destined for Mali, representing for Senegal an estimated monthly loss of 15 billion FCFA (26.54 million dollars). By late November 2025, over 2,000 containers were immobilised in Dakar. In February 2026, some 4,000 empty containers were stuck in Bamako, as truck drivers feared taking the perilous return route to Dakar.

This situation severely reduces Mali’s supply of petroleum products, refined goods, hydraulic cement and foodstuffs. It also undermines the livelihoods of thousands of drivers, traders and freight forwarders. Other corridors, particularly those linking the ports of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Bénin to the Sahel, may face similar risks.

In 2025, Mali remained Côte d’Ivoire’s top customer within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). The Abidjan-Bamako corridor plays a vital role in supplying Mali with petroleum and food products. By the end of 2025, about 1.47 million tonnes of goods had moved along this route, which is now targeted by JNIM attacks in the Sikasso region.

Mali faces a JNIM strategy aimed at cutting essential supplies

Côte d’Ivoire is also Burkina Faso’s leading African supplier, mainly of petroleum products, electricity and fertilisers. Burkina Faso’s imports come from, or transit through, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. On 14 February, seven Ghanaian tomato traders were killed in a JNIM attack in Titao, northern Burkina Faso. This incident highlights the security risks on the road linking the two countries. For now, the terrorist threat is most acute on Malian territory. Authorities have taken several measures: since November, fuel convoys have received military escort, allowing 200 to 300 tanker trucks per week to enter, compared to nearly 1,200 before the attacks began.

The government has signed a memorandum of understanding with Malian petroleum groups to simplify and accelerate customs procedures. A fuel rationing system has been introduced to combat the black market. Authorities are also seeking to reduce pressure on the ports of Dakar and Abidjan by redirecting some trade flows to other port facilities.

A truce between Bamako and jihadist groups until Eid al-Adha was reported, in exchange for the release of over a hundred prisoners accused of terrorism. However, attacks continued and Malian authorities officially denied this information.

Counter-terrorism efforts could revive regional cooperation between Sahelian and coastal states

The 25 April attacks illustrate the limits of the military approach favoured by Malian authorities against terrorism. While JNIM and FLA have set aside their differences to carry out these large-scale offensives, Sahelian and coastal states struggle to form alliances.

The regional consequences of the JNIM blockade underscore the need for joint protection of cross-border trade corridors. National governments and regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the Conseil de l’Entente, the Mano River Union and UEMOA must prevent this phenomenon from spreading to other road routes.

Counter-terrorism could serve as the engine for a much-needed revival of regional cooperation between Sahelian and coastal states in West Africa.