Mali turns to Washington as Russia’s security record falters
Mali has not cut ties with Moscow, but it is no longer behaving as though Russia were its only option. Through 2026, Bamako has been quietly rebuilding a working relationship with Washington: intelligence sharing, talks on American surveillance flights over Malian territory, and the lifting of sanctions against senior Malian officials. Russian forces are still in the country. Their record, however, is being questioned as never before.
Why Bamako is reopening a channel to Washington
For years the story was straightforward. After pushing out French and European forces, Mali under General Assimi Goïta made Moscow its main security partner, welcoming first Wagner fighters and later the Africa Corps, while drifting away from Western capitals.
That story is now cracking. Not through an official rupture, but through a series of practical decisions pointing in a different direction. Bamako is looking to widen its alliances, and Washington has returned to the table as a preferred counterpart.
The signals that matter: drones, intelligence, sanctions
The most striking shift concerns military intelligence. In March 2026, American and Malian officials were close to an agreement that would allow US aircraft and drones to fly over Mali again, tasked with tracking jihadist groups — above all JNIM, the Al-Qaeda affiliate. The talks followed Washington’s decision in February to lift sanctions targeting Mali’s defence minister and several senior officials.
None of this is marginal. During the years of tension with the West, Bamako sold Russia as the partner able to replace the old Western powers. Today the same authorities are negotiating for capabilities they clearly still need: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
Cooperation is not starting from zero. American intelligence had already been passed to Malian authorities, and some of it is said to have fed into an operation against JNIM figures. Washington now wants to formalise that arrangement rather than run it case by case.
The paradox is hard to miss: a state that turned its back on the West to move closer to Moscow appears to be rediscovering what Washington can offer.
The security record that complicates Russia’s case
The timing is not accidental, and part of the answer lies in results.
Precision matters here. Wagner’s arrival did not create Mali’s insurgency, and it would be wrong to blame Russia for every deterioration. The jihadist rebellion was already entrenched before French troops left. Armed groups are deeply rooted locally and feed on political, social, economic and geographic factors that no foreign power controls.
Still, the numbers are difficult to argue with: swapping Western partners for Russian forces did not durably curb the violence.
- American counterterrorism assessments for 2022 recorded an increase in both the number and the lethality of terrorist activity. That same year France completed its withdrawal, with the last French soldier leaving on 15 August 2022, while Malian troops, backed by Wagner, moved into the positions the French had vacated. The year was described as the deadliest in Mali’s history in terms of terrorist violence and counterterrorism operations.
- The following year brought no reversal. Assessments for 2023 again logged more attacks and greater intensity, and again labelled it the deadliest year on record, counting both jihadist attacks and operations by Malian forces alongside Wagner.
For a narrative built on the idea that Russia was the answer to Mali’s security problem, that is an uncomfortable record.
From Wagner to the Africa Corps: Moscow has not gone anywhere
It would be premature to write Russia out. Wagner has been gradually replaced by the Africa Corps, which answers directly to the Russian Ministry of Defence. Moscow therefore keeps a substantial military and political footprint in Mali.
That footprint has also taken hits. In April 2026, an offensive by JNIM and Tuareg fighters dealt serious setbacks to Malian forces and their Russian allies. Mali’s defence minister, Sadio Camara, who was trained in Russia, was killed in an attack. The Africa Corps was forced to pull out of Kidal, the strategic northern town it had helped retake in 2023.
Those reverses badly damaged Russia’s image as a guarantor of Malian security. Independent analysts have pointed to the succession of JNIM campaigns, the fuel blockade and the recent fighting as evidence that the Russian intervention has failed. That is an interpretation rather than a settled verdict, but it captures a problem Moscow can no longer ignore: the insurgency has not been defeated.
Casualty figures, a fuel blockade and a truce that speaks volumes
Data compiled through 2025 sharpens the question. Malian forces and the Russian paramilitary formations Wagner and Africa Corps are reported to have killed 918 civilians in Mali during 2025, against 232 deaths attributed to JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel. These are documented deaths and should be read with caution, yet they indicate the scale of the violence and the accusations levelled at government forces and their Russian partners.
Meanwhile the jihadists kept advancing. JNIM managed to disrupt the country’s supply corridors and to place heavy pressure on Bamako.
In March 2026, Malian authorities released around 200 people detained over suspected jihadist links, as part of an arrangement meant to secure a truce on attacks against fuel convoys. For a junta that came to power promising sovereignty and security, the symbolism is heavy.
Bamako’s real strategy: several partners, not one
A clean break with Russia remains unlikely. Moscow holds sizeable interests in Mali, notably in gold, lithium and energy, has backed mining and power projects, and continues to present itself as a committed ally of Bamako.
What is changing is the logic. Mali’s approach looks increasingly pragmatic: stop depending on a single partner. After making Moscow its main security recourse once French forces left, Bamako now appears to accept that Russia alone cannot cover all of its military and intelligence needs.
That is where the United States comes back in. Washington offers what Moscow does not always provide on the same terms — aerial and satellite intelligence, significant technological means, and deep knowledge of jihadist networks.
The opening to America may therefore be less an ideological conversion than a pragmatic admission: Mali needs more than one partner to confront a threat that its Russian alliance has not eliminated.
From a Western rupture to hard pragmatism
Mali’s recent history has taken another turn. Not long ago, Bamako denounced French and European presence and cast Russia as the sovereign alternative. Today, talks with Washington are resuming at a level that would have seemed implausible only a few years ago.
Russia is still in Mali. But its security record is contested, its forces have suffered setbacks, and the jihadists continue to threaten the country.
Against that backdrop, the American-Malian rapprochement is more than a diplomatic episode. It may mark the start of a new foreign policy in Bamako: not replacing one partner with another, but playing great-power rivalry to obtain from each what Mali needs.
Mali has not abandoned Russia. But one point is now clear: Russia’s monopoly over Mali’s security partnership may already belong to the past.