Niger: the fallout of Tiani’s crackdown and what could come next
When a leader who seized power in a coup begins to fear being toppled in turn, the consequences ripple far beyond the presidential palace. In Niger, the decree signed on 17 September stripping five citizens of their nationality including former Prime Minister Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou has ignited a public debate about where security ends and political retribution begins.
The 29 august shock that changed everything
On 26 July 2023, General Abdourahamane Tiani came to power after overthrowing Mohamed Bazoum. Three years later, on 29 August 2026, the man who took power by force found himself facing an attempted overthrow of his own.
This time, the gunfire did not come from outside. It came from within. The presidential palace was targeted. Air Base 101 was attacked. The public television station was also a target. For several hours, the balance of power remained uncertain inside the military apparatus itself. Some soldiers hesitated to take sides while mutineers sought to rally other officers.
For a man who rose to power through a coup, the message was brutal: the very scenario he had helped set in motion could now be turned against him.
A power reshaped by fear
The attempted putsch did not topple Tiani. But it profoundly altered the equation of power.
Several hundred Russian Africa Corps soldiers were reportedly needed to retake Air Base 101. At least 200 military personnel have been arrested since the events of 29 August, mainly from the special forces.
Then the chain of command began to shift. On 11 September, the chief of defence staff, General Moussa Salaou Barmou, was dismissed. Days later, four ministers were replaced. Officially, the changes are described as reorganisation, addressing dysfunction and securing the command structure.
But in politics, timing matters. And the timing tells a story: after being threatened, the regime is reorganising around those it considers most reliable.
The nationality decree and its targets
On 17 September, another thunderbolt. Tiani signed a decree provisionally stripping five people of their Nigerien nationality.
Among them is Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou, former Prime Minister under Mohamed Bazoum. The decree cites alleged offences including “intelligence with foreign powers”, spreading data likely to disturb public order, presumed participation in an effort to demoralise the army and the nation, and breaches of state security.
It must be stressed: these are accusations and prosecutions mentioned in the decree, not a final judicial conviction.
But politically, the symbolism is heavy. Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou is not just any opponent. He belongs to the former state apparatus. He served as Prime Minister under Mohamed Bazoum, the president Tiani overthrew. And that is precisely where the case takes on another dimension.
Bazoum is gone, but his shadow lingers
Three years after the coup, former President Mohamed Bazoum remains a central figure in Niger’s political confrontation. His regime has vanished. His institutions have been dismantled. But the men who served him continue to appear in the security and judicial files of the new power.
With this new decree, five Nigeriens are now provisionally deprived of their nationality under a mechanism introduced in 2024. According to the Nigerien Press Agency, the total number has now reached 25 people.
A question then arises: at what point does defending the state cease to be merely a security operation and become a political cleaning operation? The question deserves to be asked without presuming the guilt or innocence of those targeted.
A government searching for enemies everywhere?
This is where the file becomes more troubling. Since 29 August, the Nigerien authorities have had to manage a threat that no longer comes only from armed groups or external adversaries.
The threat can now, according to reported events, come from within the military apparatus itself. And when the loyalty of soldiers becomes a central question, the temptation can be strong to look for those responsible, relays, accomplices or sponsors.
The risk is then that suspicion becomes a method of government. A soldier replaced. A minister sidelined. Soldiers arrested. Former officials of the Bazoum regime targeted. And now, citizens provisionally stripped of their nationality.
Taken separately, each of these acts has its official justification. Put end to end, they nevertheless sketch the image of a power that, after being directly threatened, seeks to regain control of every circle likely to represent a vulnerability.
The paradox of a regime born from a putsch
This is the irony at the heart of the story. Tiani rose to the top after a coup. Today, he leads a regime that has itself just escaped an attempted putsch.
Between those two dates, Niger appears to have tipped into a cycle where each crisis produces new purges, each suspicion calls for a new sanction, and each attempt at contestation reinforces the concentration of power.
The 17 September decree is therefore not just a matter of nationality. It is a new episode in a broader battle: that of a power seeking to eliminate zones of uncertainty around itself.
One question remains, perhaps the most important: by fighting real or supposed plots, is Tiani building a system where any contestation automatically becomes a plot?
If so, the problem would no longer be just knowing who wants to overthrow Tiani. It would also be worth asking why a power that claims to be firmly installed now seems so afraid of those around it. And above all, how far will this logic go?
For when a regime starts to consider its own citizens as potential threats, the line between protecting the state and protecting the power becomes dangerously thin.
By Paul Ndongo — Grand reporter politique