A year has passed since the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) officially formalized its charter and established its confederation, uniting Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Throughout this period, the AES has frequently faced scrutiny regarding its capacity to deliver on its foundational promise: mutual defense. Amidst recent surges in insecurity and significant jihadist attacks impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a joint armed intervention has prompted questions among local populations and regional observers alike. This situation highlights the complex AES intervention challenges.

Several structural and strategic factors contribute to this operational inertia observed on the ground in Niger.

National armies already stretched

The primary constraint remains the overextension of national armed forces. Each member state within the alliance confronts intense security threats within its own borders:

• In Mali: The Malian army and its allies continue to concentrate their efforts on maintaining control over the country’s northern and central regions, battling groups like the Strategic Permanent Framework (JIM) and other Al-Qaeda affiliates.
• In Burkina Faso: More than half of the nation’s territory endures constant pressure from relentless terrorist assaults.
• In Niger: Nigerien forces are simultaneously tasked with securing the critical three-border region (Liptako-Gourma) against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the volatile Lake Chad basin.

Given these demanding circumstances, none of the three states possesses sufficient strategic reserves to project a significant military contingent to a neighboring country without critically weakening its own national defense capabilities. This is a key aspect of the Sahel current affairs.

Logistical hurdles for the joint force

While the political decision to unify forces was indeed made during the AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of this joint force encounters substantial material realities:

• Interopérabilité and command: Harmonizing diverse military doctrines and establishing an integrated chain of command demands considerable time and robust, secure communication networks.
• Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops across the vast distances of the Sahel requires significant resources for armored transport, consistent resupply, and advanced aerial intelligence (including drones and fighter aviation). These capabilities are currently limited and heavily utilized locally by each nation.

The influence of external partners

The withdrawal of traditional military forces, notably France and the UN mission MINUSMA, has prompted the three military regimes to reorient their partnerships, primarily towards Russia. This shift has included the deployment of paramilitary groups like Africa Corps. However, these supporting forces are predominantly deployed under bilateral agreements and are not primarily intended to conduct transborder operations under the collective banner of the AES.

A strategic focus on intelligence sharing

Beyond the concept of large-scale troop deployment, AES authorities emphasize an alternative form of cooperation: the sharing of intelligence and conducting targeted, punctual operations along shared borders. For military strategists in the Sahel, intervention does not necessarily manifest as a highly visible, extensive deployment. Instead, it often involves coordinated actions within the three-border zone, where each national army primarily operates from its own sovereign territory. This on the ground Sahel approach is central to Mali Niger Burkina reporting.